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Abstract
We analyze the effect of patent pools on the incentives to file patents related to a
comprehensive sample of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) stan-
dards. We measure a positive effect of the announcement of a pool on the filing
rates for standard-related patents. We identify an exogenous policy change between
1997 and 1999, when antitrust authorities adopted a more permissive stance towards
pooling of patents. An important number of pools were created in the wake or in
response to this policy change. Studying these pools, we find a significant increase
in patenting rates after pool announcement. This increase in patenting is primarily
attributable to future members of the pool, as confirmed by Instrumental Variable
regressions using firm-level characteristics associated with a higher likelihood of
joining a patent pool. Pool creations taking place in later years could be more easily
anticipated. Indeed, we find that the announcements of later pools is preceded by
unusually high levels of patenting. Furthermore, we show that pool announcements
with a higher likelihood of successful pool creation are followed by a stronger increase
in patenting. We find no significant effect of patent pool announcements on the
number of citation-weighted patent files.
JEL-Classification: L24, O34
Kewords: Patent Pools, Technology Standards, Patent Licensing, Innovation incen-
tives
1 Introduction
Complex Information and Communication Technologies (ICT), and in particular technology
standards, are often protected by a large number of complementary patents. In this
context, it has become frequent that companies license out their patents through patent
pools, providing users with a single license for a bundle of patents held by different
firms. This mechanism can help to increase transparency and reduce transaction costs.
Pools including only patents which are complementary and necessary for implementing
a technology furthermore eliminate wasteful multiple margins (Lerner and Tirole, 2004).
Recent antitrust guidelines have therefore endorsed the permissive stance towards such
patent pools practiced over the last two decades1.
The effect of patent pools on the incentives to innovate is however subject to debate.
The theoretical literature (Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Dequiedt and Versaevel, 2013; Schmidt,
2014) mostly predicts a positive effect of pools on innovation incentives. Recent empirical
research (Lampe and Moser, 2012; Joshi and Nerkar, 2011; Flamm, 2013) in contrast shows
that the creation of several pools was followed by a decline in related innovation activities.
These findings however only describe a decline in follow-on innovation once existing patents
were bundled into a pool. The economic effect of patent pools also includes the incentives
to file patents to be included into an announced or expected future pool.
This paper analyzes the effect of both the announcement and the creation of a patent
pool on innovation. We create a unique database of 50 patent pool launches, including
both effective pool creations and failed attempts. We investigate the relationship between
pool announcement and creation and standard-related innovation efforts using data on
more than 20,000 patents that are presumed essential to the standards underlying the pool
licensing programs. Using the technological classification of the standard-essential patents,
we build a comprehensive database of patents that are technologically related to these
technology standards. We include patents filed by 190 companies contributing patented
technology to the technology standards in our sample. We describe the usual pattern how
the number of patent files evolves over time during the development of a standard. We
then analyze whether the announcement or creation of a pool induces a change in the rate
at which standard-related patents are filed.
We examine not only the reaction to observed pool creation, but also anticipatory
patenting when a patent pool creation is expected. Economic theory predicts that expected
pool creation induces anticipatory patenting in view of inclusion into the future pool (Lerner
and Tirole, 2004; Dequiedt and Versaevel, 2013). The empirical analysis of the timing
of innovation in standard development furthermore suggests that effective pool creation
takes place after most significant innovation efforts have already been made. We therefore
expect that substantial effects of patent pools on related innovation efforts materialize
in the periods preceding the expected creation of a pool. Furthermore, expectation of a
pool can induce firms to anticipate innovation investments, which is another potential
1see for instance Chapter 3 in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights issued by the Department of Justice (DoJ) in 2007. The guidelines are available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/hearings/ip/222655.pdf
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explanation for the decline in innovation rate following up to pool creation observed in
previous studies.
Expectations regarding pool creation have been strongly affected by an exogenous
policy change from 1997 to 1999. While there have been pools in different technological
areas until World War II (Lampe and Moser, 2012), stricter enforcement of competition
law outlawed most attempted pool creations from the end of World War II until the 1990s
(Gilbert, 2004). A new wave of patent pools was launched in the area of ICT technology
standards. The earliest of these pools were developed in an uncertain policy environment.
In 1997 and 1999, the European and American antitrust authorities however authorized
a new model of patent pooling for two important standards. After this precedent, many
other important pools including the same safeguards against anticompetitive abuses have
been created and authorized. This policy change significantly altered the expectations of
firms regarding the likelihood of a future pool creation. We can thus compare two groups
of patent pools which developed in very different processes, giving rise to sensibly different
expectations.
We find robust evidence for a significant positive effect of patent pools on patenting.
The early patent pools launched in the wake of the policy change in competition policy are
followed by a significant increase in patenting rates. There is no increase in patenting after
pool launches in the later years, when pool creation has become a routine practice. These
pool creations however follow up on periods of intense patenting. Both the increase in
patenting after early pool launches and the high patenting intensity before the creation of
later pools are attributable to prospective pool members. Instrumental Variable regressions
confirm that firms more likely ex ante to join a patent pool display a stronger reaction to
pool launches than other firms declaring to own standard-essential patents for the same
standards.
We refine the analysis by computing the ex ante probability that a pool launch will
result in a successful pool creation. We confirm that the magnitude of the effect of a pool
announcement depends upon its likelihood of success. Once again, we use Instrumental
Variable regressions to confirm that the effect of pool announcements is more pronounced
in the case of standards for which a pool is ex ante more likely to be successful. Reiterating
our analyses to explain changes in the number of citation-weighted patent files, we find
little evidence for significant effects of pool announcement or creation. These findings
suggest that while patent pools increase the incentives to file additional patents, they do
not seem to provide as significant impulses for significant technological innovation.
2 Review of the Literature
The notion of patent pool can describe different licensing mechanisms. Spulber (2013)
analyzes patent pools as cross-licensing agreements. Cross-licensing agreements induce
incentives to free-ride on other firms’ innovation efforts and thus provide lower innovation
incentives than individual licensing. Furthermore, the term patent pool has been in
the past applied to price-fixing cartels among holders of substitutable patents. Such
agreements are found to induce higher prices and reduce innovation efforts (Lampe and
Moser, 2012). We will restrict our analysis to contemporary ICT patent pools. These pools
provide standardized licensing contracts for bundles of patents held by pool members to all
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interested parties 2. Furthermore, strict antitrust enforcement leads contemporary patent
pools to appoint third party experts to ascertain that all patents included are strictly
complementary and necessary for the implementation of a particular technology standard.
In addition, pools are not allowed to restrict the rights of their members to negotiate
bilateral licensing agreements with potential licensees who do not wish to purchase a pool
license.
For the case of patent pools operating under these rules, Lerner and Tirole (2004) and
a stream of subsequent theoretical literature predict a positive effect on the incentives to
invest in related R&D. By cutting down multiple margins, reducing transaction costs and
facilitating patent enforcement (Delcamp, 2015), patent pools generate value for the holders
of the included patents. Patent pools should thus induce an unambiguous positive effect
on ex ante incentives to invest in R&D in view of obtaining patents qualifying for inclusion
into a pool (Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Schmidt, 2014). Aoki and Schiff (2008) and Schmidt
(2010) predict that prospective patent pools can even induce wasteful overinvestment.
Dequiedt and Versaevel (2013) analyze the dynamic incentives for R&D in view of a patent
pool. In their model, patent pools increase innovation incentives, and especially induce
patent races preceding the launch of the pool. Patent pools are also expected to have
positive ex post effects on innovation. By solving the royalty stacking problem, pools
reduce the cost and increase the profit margin for follow-up innovators (Llanes and Trento,
2012).
The effects of pools on innovation are less clear when firms can strategically adapt
the propensity to patent. Many pools redistribute royalties according to the number of
patents, inducing incentives to inflate patent portfolios (Baron and Delcamp, 2015; Peters,
2011)3.Choi and Gerlach (2013) find that patent pools can be detrimental for innovation
because they induce an increase in the incentives to file weak patents, i.e. patents that
have a lower likelihood of being found valid in court. While these arguments can explain a
negative effect of patent pools on innovation, they nevertheless predict a positive effect of
patent pools on the filing rate of patents qualifying for such a pool.
In contrast to these arguments, recent empirical advances point to a negative effect
of patent pools not only on innovation, but also on patenting. Lampe and Moser (2010)
find that the creation of a sewing machine patent pool in the 19th century was followed
by a decline in innovation4. In a study of patent pools in the 1930s, Lampe and Moser
(2012) find that most of these pools had a negative effect on subsequent patenting in the
field. The patent pools created before 1945 frequently included substitutable patents and
therefore chilled down technological rivalry. These concerns do not apply to contemporary
pools. Joshi and Nerkar (2011) nevertheless find that the creation of the DVD patent
pools was followed by a decline in related patenting by pool licensors and licensees. Flamm
(2013) highlights contrasted effects of patent pools for optical disk technology depending
2Even though in some instances patent pools co-exist with cross-licensing agreements between pool
members, cross-licensing is not a feature of the patent pool itself. Patent pools offer non-discriminatory
licenses at the same conditions to pool members and outside licensees.
3Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) find that holders of the most valuable patents prefer staying out of pools
practicing such a numerical royalty sharing rule.
4The authors discuss evidence for an increased patent propensity, but a decreased rate of progress in the
technical performance of sewing machines.
3
upon the details of the organizational arrangement. While he identifies a positive effect of
the CD patent pool, he discusses evidence for a negative effect of the DVD patent pools.
All existing empirical studies identify the effect of the pool by measuring a change
in the rate of patenting or innovation once existing patents are bundled into pools. The
theoretical analysis of patent pools in contrast focuses on the incentives to file patents to
be included into a prospective pool. The existing empirical literature does not analyze
whether the expectation of a pool induces incremental innovation incentives. Simcoe (2007)
argues that the reduced difficulties in creating patent pools after 1999 have contributed to
the surge in the number of declared standard essential patents. There is so far however no
empirical evidence to confirm this hypothesis. This paper fills this gap and analyzes the
effect of occurred and announced patent pool creations on the incentives to innovate.
This paper also departs from the existing literature by analyzing a large set of both
institutionally and technologically similar patent pools. Furthermore, this is the first
empirical paper explicitly relating the analysis of patent pool creation to the preceding
standard development. Almost all contemporary patent pools are created for technological
standards developed in standard setting organizations (SSO). Llanes and Poblete (2014)
present a theoretical model combining the analysis of standard setting and pool formation.
They show that taking the standard development process into account has sharp impli-
cations for the predicted effects of patent pools. A growing body of empirical literature
studies innovation in technological standards5. This is the first empirical study on patent
pools using data on the process of standard development in order to distinguish the effect
of pool creation from the effects of the preceding standardization activities.
3 Empirical methodology
3.1 Data: Patent pools, technology standards and declared standard-
essential patents
We built up a novel, comprehensive database of 50 contemporary patent pools, including
both effectively created pools and failed pooling attempts. For each patent pool, we
identify the licensing administrator and search the website of the administrator for the first
mention of the pool project. In many cases, this is a call for patents issued by a licensing
administrator willing to operate a pool for a specific technology. We also identify the
date of effective pool creation, which is defined as the date from which on it is effectively
possible to take a license from the pool, and the date of pool withdrawal if the pool no
longer operates. Using the Internet Archives, we download the list of pool members for
every year since pool creation, and check for each company the period of membership. We
have made the full dataset on patent pools available online6.
The aim of our analysis is to assess whether patent pools have contributed to fuel
patent-driven innovation in technology standards. We therefore identify for each patent
pool the standard or set of standards describing the technology licensed out through the
5e.g. Leiponen (2008); Rysman and Simcoe (2008); Delcamp and Leiponen (2014); Baron et al. (2014)
6http://www.law.northwestern.edu/faculty/programs/searlecenter/innovationeconomics/data/technologystandards/index.html
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Standard or Project Pool Administrator Pool Launch Release
AGORA-C AGORA-C Via Licensing 2008
AMR AMR VoiceAge 2004 1999
AMR-WB+ AMR-WB+ VoiceAge 2004 2004
AMR-WB/G.722.2 AMR-WB/G.722.2 VoiceAge 2009 2002
ATSC ATSC MPEGLA 2004 1995
AVC/H.264 AVC(MPEGLA) MPEGLA 2002 2003
AVC AVC(ViaLicensing) Via Licensing 2002 2003
BluRay One Blue One Blue/One Red 2005 2002
BluRay Premier BD Premier BD 2005 2002
CDMA-2000 CDMA-2000 Sisvel 2007 2000
DAB DAB Philips 1998 1997
DVB-MHP DVB-MHP Via Licensing 2004 1998
dvb-t dvb-t(MPEGLA) MPEGLA 2001 1997
dvb-t dvb-t(Sisvel) Sisvel 2001 1997
dvb-t2 dvb-t2 Sisvel 2009 2009
DVD DVD3C Philips 1997 1995
DVD DVD6C Toshiba 1997 1995
Digital Radio Mondiale Digital Radio Mondiale Via Licensing 2002 2001
G 711.1 G 711.1 SiproLab 2008 2008
G 723.1 G 723.1 SiproLab 2000 1996
G 729 G 729 SiproLab 1998 1996
G 729.1 G 729.1 SiproLab 2006 2006
H.264 SVC H.264 SVC Sisvel 2012 2007
IEEE 1394 IEEE 1394 MPEGLA 1999 1995
IEEE 802.11a-g IEEE 802.11 Via Licensing 2003 1997
LTE LTE(Sisvel) Sisvel 2009 2008
LTE LTE(ViaLicensing) Via Licensing 2009 2008
mp3 MPEG Audio Sisvel 1990 1992
mp3 mp3 Licensing Thomson 1990 1992
MPEG Surround MPEG Surround MPEGLA 2008 2007
MPEG2 MPEG2 MPEGLA 1993 1994
MPEG2 AAC MPEG2 AAC Via Licensing 1998 1996
MPEG4 Audio MPEG4 Audio Via Licensing 2002 1999
MPEG4 SLS MPEG4 SLS Via Licensing 2009 2005
MPEG4 Systems MPEG4 Systems MPEGLA 2000 1999
MPEG4 Visual MPEG4 Visual MPEGLA 2000 1999
MVC MVC MPEGLA 2011 2009
NFC NFC Via Licensing 2004 2003
OCAP OCAP Via Licensing 2004
GSM Second Generation Wireless SiproLab 1998 1990
TOP Teletext TOP Teletext Sisvel 1998
TV Anytime TV Anytime Via Licensing 2003 2003
UHF-RFID UHF-RFID (MPEGLA) MPEGLA 2005 2004
UHF-RFID UHF-RFID (Sisvel) Sisvel 2005 2004
UHF-RFID UHF-RFID (Via Licensing) Via Licensing 2005 2004
VC-1 (former VC-9) VC-1 MPEGLA 2004 2006
W-CDMA W-CDMA Platform WCDMA 2004 2001
WSS WSS Sisvel 2009 1994
Table 1: Overview over the pools in our sample
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pool. Matching pools with standards is straightforward, because pool administrators
clearly display the technological standards that are covered by the pool license. For our
analysis, we organize the data by firms and standards. Our pools are related to 43 different
standards or standardization projects. The technology standards covered by pools can be
single technical specifications (like a speech codec, e.g. G729.1), or complex technological
systems consisting in hundreds of technical specifications (like BluRay or LTE)7 In 7 cases,
we identify multiple pools for the same standard 8. In these cases, we use the earliest pool
to determine the date of pool launch or the date at which licenses become available. A
firm is classified as pool member if it is a member of either of the different competing
pools.
We then identify the set of firms with patenting activities related to the technology
standard underlying the pool. For 34 standards, we can access lists of declared standard-
essential patents on the websites of the issuing SSO. We identify 8,891 declared essential
patents from declarations made by 190 companies9. We define the set of firms with
patenting activities related to the standard as comprising all firms that at some time
were member of a pool related to the standard, all firms declaring to the SSO that they
own standard-essential patents for this standard, and the 30 largest patent holders in the
technological field of the standard. The technological field of the standard is described
by the technological classification of the patents included in the pool and the declared
standard-essential patents(see Section 3.2).
28 patent pools in our sample are related to technology standards issued by formal
SSOs10. For these standards, we collected bibliographic information from the PERINORM
database11, including data on version updates, standard amendments, number of pages,
technical classification and the year of standard release. In the case of patent pools related
to consortium standards that are not included in the PERINORM database (such as DVD
and Blu-Ray), we researched standard characteristics and the dates of standard version
releases on the websites of the respective standards consortium.
7Patent pools like OneBlue are also referred to as ”pools of pools”, because they combine different licensing
programs for different aspects of a complex technological system. We refer to these pools as aggregate
pools. These pools bundle patent portfolios for different technological specifications that are all necessary
for a particular technological system. We call a pool disaggregate if it covers a single technical specification
that can be used in different technological systems (such as the video compression technology AVC that
is used in optical disc standards, digital video broadcasting, and internet applications).
8In some cases, one pool is the successor of the other pool. In most cases however, the different pools
simultaneously license out patents that are essential to the same standard, but held by different sets of
firms.
9The number of declarations is higher than the number of declared patents, because we also include
so-called blanket declarations (a generic declaration that a company owns essential patents without
specifying the patent number), and we count patents declared essential to various standards as multiple
declarations. For institutional aspects of the patent declaration data, refer to Bekkers et al. (2012)
10This notion refers to large organizations with institutionalized standardization procedures which op-
erate on an international level: the formal SSOs in our sample are the International Organization
for Standardization (ISO), the Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC1) of ISO and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T/ITU-R), the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineering (IEEE)
11PERINORM is the World’s biggest database with bibliographic information on formal standards and is
regularly updated by the SSOs Deutsches Institut fur Normung (DIN), the British Standards Institute
(BSI) and the Association francaise pour la normalisation (AFNOR).
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3.2 Measuring standard-related patenting
We create a measure of standard-related patent counts using information on patents
that are presumed to be essential to these standards. This includes patents declared as
standard-essential by their owners, and patents evaluated to be standard-essential by the
patent pool evaluation expert. While standard essential patents claim an invention that is
necessarily used by any implementation of a standard, they only constitute a small share
of patents that actually relate to the standardized technology. In case of the declared
standard-essential patents, the claim of standard essentiality is not assessed by a third
party, and both the propensity to declare patents as standard-essential and the timing of
declaration are subject to strategic considerations (Bekkers et al., 2012; Ganglmair and
Tarantino, 2014). In case of the patents evaluated by the pool experts, these only include
patents that were submitted to the pool, thus excluding the patenting activities of pool
outsiders.
Similar to Baron et al. (2014), our approach is not to count SEPs but to make use
of the CPC/IPC classifications of SEPs to identify other patents that also are relevant
to the standards. To this end, we gather more than 20,000 different standard essential
patent families to map specific standards documents to disaggregated CPC and IPC
classes (8 digit classification). The technological field of each standard is characterized
by a vector of weights on each CPC/IPC class identified as relevant for each standard.
The weight is calculated as the relative prevalence of this CPC/IPC class in the sample
of standard-essential patents. We compare different weights for primary and extended
CPC/IPC classes, different subclass aggregations (4 and 8 digits) as well as different patent
counts (discounted by families or forward citations) and different company-standard pair
groupings to test our method of mapping patent activities to standard relevant CPCs/IPCs
(comparison of the different weights and counts can be consulted in the appendix).
We build up a panel of company-standard pairs, tracking each firm’s patent filing
activities using the PATSTAT database. We make use of company name cleaning methods,
identifying all patent numbers, INPADOC family IDs, primary and extended CPC/IPC as
well as a count of forward citations per patent. We aggregate all information to the patent
family level counting priority families for each company-year observation per CPC/IPC.
We compute family counts for each standard-company-year combination in our sample (for
details of the matching methods consult the appendix). For testing the fit of our measure,
we compare the evolution of family counts with a standard’s lifetime development. The
main technology development of a standardized technology is completed when the first
version of the standard document is released. One would thus expect innovation activities
to decrease just after a standard release. Figure 2 plots our aggregated measure of standard
related family counts over the standards lifetime 13 years prior and 13 after a standard
release. The plots are normalized coefficients of regressed standard age dummies over the
full sample of observation (please consult the appendix for the regression details).
Figure 1 reveals that standard-related patenting follows a hump shape, peaking prior
to standard release. The shape of the curve very well shows that our measure of standard
related patenting correlates with the timing of standardization (for a further validation of
our measure consult the appendix). While most innovation takes place before standard
release, there are still significant levels of patenting observed up to several years after
standard release.Baron and Delcamp (2015) document that a significant share of the
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Figure 1: Normalized coefficients of standard age dummies before and
after standard release
patents included in a pool have been filed after pool creation and standard release. Part
of this patenting activity could be a response to observed pool creation. The figure
however illustrates that it would be a mistake to identify the effect of patent pools from a
change in the level of patenting before and after pool creation without taking the standard
development into account. Pool creation occurs in a late stage in the technological life
cycle of a standard, where innovation efforts generally decline significantly. Controlling
for the standard life cycle is crucial in order to relate the observed rate of patenting and
innovation to a plausible counterfactual.
3.3 The policy change
Patent pools were common in the late 19th Century and the first half of the 20th Century.
Lampe and Moser (2012) reviewed as many as 20 patent pool that were active in the 1930s.
These pools benefited from a lenient enforcement of US antitrust law, even though many of
these pools involved explicit price-fixing among holders of technological substitutes (Lampe
and Moser, 2012). After World War II, the enforcement of competition law towards patent
licensing became more restrictive in general 12, and no other patent pool was successfully
created until the 1990s.
The situation changed again in 1995, when the Department of Justice issued new
guidelines for a more benevolent scrutiny of patent licensing13 and placed the analysis of
patent pools under the rule of reason. ”The 1995 guidelines were a cautious endorsement
of patent pools that revived the practice” (Miller and Almeling, 2007). The standard for
12This tougher stance was stated explicitly in 1970 in the U.S. Department of Justice’s list of ”nine no-no’s”,
nine practices in patenting licenses that would be considered per-se illegal” (Gilbert and Shapiro, 1997)
13”The 1995 Guidelines extolled the procompetitive benefits of patent licensing and prescribed a cautious
approach to antitrust scrutiny of patent license agreements” (Homiller, 2006)
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applying the rule of reason to patent pools was set in the three subsequent years. In two
favorable business reviews in 1997 and 1999, the European and US competition authorities
cleared the MPEG2 and DVD patent pools, the first modern patent pools related to
ICT technology standards14. In March 1998, the FTC challenged a patent pool bundling
competing patents held by two different firms, Summit Technology Inc. and VISX Inc 15,
thus clarifying the legal boundaries to the practice of pooling patents.
The favorable business review by European and American competition authorities of
two large pool licensing schemes between 1997 and 1999 triggered a new wave of patent
pools following the examples of MPEG2 and DVD. Including very similar safeguards as
the pools previously authorized, none of these pool creations has met any resistance from
antitrust authorities. ”The DOJ business review letters provide a template for patent
pooling arrangements that should not run afoul of the antitrust laws. The letters embody
a new thinking in economics and law and contrast sharply with early judicial opinions
about the legality of patent pooling arrangements.” (Gilbert, 2004).
The number of pools announced and created increases after 1999. Pool licensing
has become more routine and more predictable. At least four licensing firms started
specializing on the administration of patent pools16. Beginning in 2000, these licensing
administrators launched several new pool licensing programs every year. In at least
one instance, an important SSO has initiated a formal collaboration with a licensing
administrator17. Several SSOs adopted explicit policies to encourage the formation of
patent pools for their standards18 Over time, an increasing number of new pools are related
to new technology standards succeeding on a standard that was already licensed through
a pool. In many cases, there is a very substantial overlap between the membership of the
pools for the previous and the new standard generation19. Baron and Delcamp (2015)
find that past involvement in previous patent pools is a very significant predictor of how
quickly firms join a new pool.
Overall, our observation period from 1992 to 2013 has thus been a period of a
pronounced policy change with respect to pools. The early patent pools were announced
and created in an uncertain policy environment. The timing and success of pool formation
were therefore subject to changes in competition law enforcement practice in addition to
the technological life cycle of the specific standard. Furthermore, companies could not
fully anticipate the future possibility of monetizing their patents through a patent pool
while the standard was under development. The pools launched more recently result from
a stable institutional environment, and respond only to technological and commercial
considerations. Companies can easily anticipate future pool creations, and often decide




16These four firms are: MPEGLA, Via Licensing, Sisvel and SiproLab
17Collaboration agreement between IEEE and Via Licensing of December 2008
18The DVB consortium e.g. states in its IPR policy: ”The DVB fosters by applying a number of tools to
encourage patent holders to form patent pools promptly after standardisation”.
19E.g. the three founding members of DVD3C in 1999 all joined the OneBlue patent pool for BluRay 13
years later, whereas X of the 9 DVD6C members are today members of the PremierBD patent pool for
BluRay.
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on whether to become a pool member even while the standard specification is still under
development20. We will take this change in the policy environment into account, and will
make use of this exogenous source of variation in order to identify the causal effect of pool
announcements and creation.
4 Results
4.1 Reaction to pool announcement and creation
We begin our analysis by regressing standard-related patent files on variables describing the
standard development process. Our method of mapping the standards underlying the pools
to related technology classes has resulted in a count of standard-related patent applications.
The evolution of this count is characterized by an inverted-U relationship around standard
release: the intensity of standard-related patenting increases up to standard release and
eventually decreases. We will control for this ”typical” pattern of patenting in the standard
development process by including a square of the age of the standard age in the regression.
Standard age measures the number of years since standard release (and is negative before
standard release). The square of standard age thus measures the distance in time to a
future or past standard release.
All firms are observed over the whole period of time, and we apply standard-firm pair
fixed effects. We furthermore control for technological shocks in the wider technological
field, policy changes or macroeconomic effects by including a full set of year dummies.
We furthermore include two control variables. First, we include the 1 year lag of the
cumulative number of patent declarations made by all firms to the specific standard.
This is an important control variable that captures strategic interactions between firms,
for instance patent races or portfolio patenting strategies in the context of patent wars.
Second, we wish to control for changes in the market success or implementation rate of the
standard. We therefore use the yearly number of mentions of the standard name in business
communications by the entire sample of firms, which we obtain from ProQuest (Baron
et al., 2014). The mentions of standards in business communications should correlate for
instance with the market introduction of new products implementing the standard.
We estimate this baseline model (Model 1), which will be our empirical workhorse
throughout the analysis, for the entire sample of standard-company pairs. The sample
consists in firms that appear to develop technologies related to this particular standard,
either because they declare standard-essential patents, join a standard-related pool, or
figure among the Top 30 patent holders in the standard-related technological field. Results
are displayed in the following Table 2.
We analyze the effect of pools by including a set of different variables. Call open
indicates that a pool has been announced, but not yet created. In the case of failed
launches, the variable is set back to zero after three years. Licenses available indicates
20The DVB e.g. provides for a mechanism for early confirmation by a technology contributor of its
willingness to participate in a pooling effort ; and information meetings of patent holders and other
interested parties while the specification is under development.
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(1) (2)
Related patents Related patents





Standard age squared -5.3973 -6.4256
(-17.90) (-17.92)
Declarations cumul 1.0881 1.1315
(28.21) (27.66)





t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 2: Regression results Models 1 and 2
that at least one patent pool has been created and is active for this standard. The results
of this specification are in line with the existing empirical literature (Joshi and Nerkar,
2011; Lampe and Moser, 2010, 2012). The announcement of a future pool creation, and
even more so the creation of a pool, are followed by a significant decrease in the rates of
standard-related patenting. We however argue that this decrease must not be interpreted
as a causal effect. This estimated ”effect” of pool announcement and creation can have
multiple non-causal explanations. Patent pools can for instance be endogenously created
as reaction to peaks in patenting. Furthermore, companies could increase their level of
patenting in expectation of a pool announcement in the near future. The prospect of a pool
creation could also induce firms to expedite their R&D and anticipate standard-related
patenting (Dequiedt and Versaevel, 2013). Finally, our general baseline model of patenting
over standard development does obviously not capture the standard specific details of the
life cycle from R&D and standard development to implementation and licensing. The
creation of a patent pool is likely to simply correlate with the moment in time at which
the technology is ready for implementation, and manufacturing companies can begin
subscribing to a licensing program. All these different considerations are consistent with a
decline in patenting rates after pool creation. We will address this issue in the following
sections.
4.2 Patenting around pool announcement
We highlighted a decline in the intensity of standard-related patenting after the announce-
ment and especially after the creation of a patent pool. There are good reasons to think
that this does not reflect the causal effect of patent pools on patenting incentives. In
particular, the economic theory on patent pools (Lerner and Tirole, 2004; Aoki and Schiff,
2008; Dequiedt and Versaevel, 2013) to a very large extent focuses upon the effect of
expected patent pools on the incentives to file patents that could be included in the pool.
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The actual creation of pools typically occurs late in the standard life cycle. It is implausible
to expect high rates of significant inventions leading to standard-essential patents that
occur after companies already started licensing from the pool. In order to identify the
causal effect of patent pools, we therefore focus on the announcements of future pools
(what we call pool launch.
Model 3 (Table 3) shows that these pools announcements take place in periods
characterized by high intensity of standard-related patenting. We include dummy variables
for periods respectively 2 years or 1 year before, or 1 year or 2 years after pool announcement,
as well as a dummy for the year of pool announcement itself. Both in the periods before
and after pool announcement, the levels of patenting are higher than explained by standard
fixed effects and standard age. We need to disentangle the reaction of firms to pool
announcements from the endogenous timing of these events. Furthermore, we expect that
companies can observe signals of future pool announcements, and that a large part of the
effect of pool announcements can take the form of anticipatory behavior.
We rely in this section on a pronounced policy change that occurred over a relatively
short period of time as a source of exogenous variation. As discussed, the positive business
review of two important patent pools by American and European competition authorities
from 1997 to 1999 reflect a drastic change in the competition law enforcement practice
with respect to patent pools. A set of early patent pools thus were created as in the
wake or as immediate consequence of changes in the regulatory environment. All these
pools were the first of their kind, and the first pool operated by their respective licensing
administrator. The creation of these pools was difficult to anticipate, and the timing of
the creation of these pools at least in part responds to the timing of the regulatory change.
After this policy change, a large number of pools have been created by specialized pool
licensing administrators running multiple, very similar, pool licensing programs. These
pools are easier to anticipate, and the timing of pool announcement is fully dictated by
strategic and technological considerations.
In Models 4 and 5, we find empirical support for this analysis21. While patenting picks
up after the launch of the early patent pools (announced up to 1999), the announcement
of these pools is not preceded by periods of unusually high levels of patenting. This is
consistent with our idea that these pools were more difficult to anticipate, and that the
regulatory constraints prevented these pools from being endogenously created as a direct
response to peaks in patenting. We find the reverse result for the case of patent pools
announced after 1999. The announcement of these pools occurs in years characterized by
significantly higher than usual levels of patenting (and especially following up to periods
of intense patenting). There is however no indication that patenting picks up after pool
announcement in the case of these later pools.
The preceding analysis suggests to focus on the group of early pools for the identification
of the causal effects of pool announcement on patenting. Indeed, for this group of pools,
we find no evidence for significant anticipatory behavior or that the timing of pool creation
in responds to peaks in patenting. In the following, we use heterogeneity in firm and
21In order to account for smaller sample size in the subsamples, we conflate periods before pool announce-
ments (one year or two years before announcements) and periods after announcement (the year of
announcement as well as the two following years) into two different variables.
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(3) (4) (5)
Related patents Related patents Related patents
All pools Early pools Later pools
Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS
Launch minus 2 463.7 11.22 519.5
(4.48) (0.13) (4.05)
Launch minus 1 468.0 48.17 518.4
(4.65) (0.64) (4.04)
Year of launch 447.0 61.93 237.1
(4.43) (0.83) (1.83)
Launch plus 1 327.4 -24.02 52.48
(3.25) (-0.32) (0.41)
Launch plus 2 290.8 311.6 -134.4
(2.89) (4.72) (-1.02)
Standard age squared -4.741 0.726 -2.808
(-15.10) (0.81) (-6.69)
Declarations cumulative 1.084 0.128 3.243
(28.10) (4.51) (39.75)
Newsfeed cumulative 0.000861 -0.000186 -0.0825
(0.35) (-0.16) (-11.90)
Constant 709.9 176.7 602.0
(7.75) (3.07) (5.18)
Observations 23478 5565 17913
Groups 1,118 265 853
t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 3: Regression results Models 3, 4 and 5
standard characteristics for difference-in-differences analysis. In particular, we will show
that firms that are more likely to join a patent pool display a stronger increase in patenting
in response to the pool announcement, and that the effect of pool announcement is stronger
in the case of standards for which a pool is more likely to draw an important share of the
relevant patents.
4.3 Effect of pool announcements: Pool members vs. outsiders
To further refine our results, we analyze the effect of patent pools on pool members and
outsiders. In most cases, only a minority of the qualifying firms decide to join a pool
(Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011). Furthermore, the decision to join a patent pool or
not can to an important extent be explained by observable characteristics of the firm or
its standard-related patent portfolio. Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) for instance show
that pool membership is less attractive for firms holding high-quality patents, and more
attractive for firms that themselves practice the technology standard related to the pool.
We will thus investigate whether the effect of pool announcement documented in the
previous sections is attributable to those companies that eventually joined the pool. We
therefore create a time-invariant dummy variable indicating whether a company has ever
been listed as pool member in our period of observation. We interact this variable with
our dummy variables indicating 2 year periods before or after pool announcement. The
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results in Table 4 confirm that in the case of the early pools, the increase in patenting
after pool announcement is fully attributable to those companies that opted to join the
pool. Those companies that will never join the pool do not display a significant change
in patenting rates after pool announcement. In the case of later pools, we also find that
the high patenting intensity prior to pool announcement is to a large extent attributable
to future pool members. Those companies that will never join the pool however also
display a significantly higher than usual patenting intensity in the two years before pool
announcement. This suggests that the peak in patenting prior to pool announcement
not only reflects anticipatory behavior. For instance, it is plausible that patent pools are
created in response to peaks in patenting. We thus focus on the set of early pools for
identification of the causal effect of pool membership.
(6) (7) (8)
Related patents Related patents Related patents
All pools Early pools Later pools
Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS
Launch minus 1,2 382.9 -14.25 371.5
(4.48) (-0.20) (3.45)
Launch plus 0,1,2 377.7 47.02 54.32
(5.27) (0.89) (0.58)
Launch minus 1,2 member 340.6 194.4 599.5
(2.03) (1.70) (2.91)
Launch plus 0,1,2 member -92.93 331.7 3.313
(-0.67) (3.86) (0.02)
Standard age squared -4.742 0.921 -2.817
(-15.11) (1.03) (-6.71)
Declarations cumulative 1.083 0.116 3.241
(28.04) (4.04) (39.75)
Newsfeed cumulative 0.000961 -0.000676 -0.0827
(0.39) (-0.57) (-11.92)
Constant 725.2 218.4 742.7
(8.01) (3.36) (6.17)
Observations 23478 5565 17913
Groups 1,118 265 853
t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 4: Regression results Models 6, 7 and 8
The finding that the patenting rates of future pool members pick up after pool
announcement may still be plagued by an endogeneity concern. The concern is that the
causality may also go in the reverse direction: companies join an emerging pool because
they have recently been very actively patenting in the related technological area. In order
to address this concern, we identify general characteristics of firms measured at the time
of the pool announcement (i.e. ex ante to the subsequent increase in patenting) that are
strongly and significantly associated with being a pool member. In particular, we confirm
a finding from the existing literature (Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011), which suggests
that firms holding better quality patents (as measured by the average number of forward
citations for their patents in the standard-related field) and firms that do not practice the
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technology themselves have a significantly lower probability of joining a pool. We do not
observe which companies practice the standards in our sample. We can however categorize
firms into manufacturing companies, network operators and R&D specialists. The latter
groups comprises public research institutions, universities, pure R&D companies, fabless
manufacturers and intermediaries in the market for technologies. R&D specialists have a
significantly lower likelihood of joining patent pools - indeed, the propensity to join patent
pools more generally decreases with the ratio of R&D expenditures over the value of sales.
As a first step, we thus estimate how the likelihood of joining a patent pool depends
upon a list of ex ante firm characteristics. We therefore build a cross section of firm-
standard pairs observed in the year of pool announcement. For each firm, we count the
number of patents in the standard-related technological classes, the number of declared
standard-essential patents, the number of patents in related technological classes weighted
by forward citations, the total number of patents (in all technological fields), the total
average number of forward citations by patent, the total number of declared standard-
essential patents, we compute the ratio of R&D expenses over the value of sales, and
we assign a dummy variable to R&D specialists. We run a logistic regression to explain
whether a company will eventually join the announced pool, including dummies for the
different standards. The results, presented in Table 5, are in line with findings in Layne-
Farrar and Lerner (2011) and our discussions with practitioners. We find that the number
of patents in the related field and the number of declared standard-essential patents are
positively associated with the likelihood of being a pool member. The average ”quality” (in
terms of citations) of the standard-related portfolio, the overall number of patents owned
by the firm, the general average quality of its portfolio, and the R&D intensity on the firm
level, are all negatively associated with the propensity of joining a pool.
(9)
Member (time-invariant)
Logit, cross-section at launch year




Num. related patents, cit.-wtd. -0.00000837
(-1.76)
Total number patents -0.00000579
(-3.00)
Cits. per patent -0.00188
(-3.44)







t statistics in parentheses
Standard fixed effects included but not reported
Table 5: Regression results Model 9
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We pick the two variables already suggested by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) to
instrument for future pool participation. First, we use the average quality of patents. We
take the citation to patents ratio on the firm level in order to address more convincingly
the exclusion criterion. A firm holding good quality patents for a particular standard is
likely to intensify its investments in this particular area. The average quality of the patent
portfolio at the firm level is less likely to be affected by this concern. Second, we use the
dummy variable assigned to R&D specialists22. Because our explanatory variable is an
interaction term between prospective membership and the period following up to pool
announcement, we also interact our candidate instruments with the dummy for periods
after pool announcement.
The results in Table 6 confirm the results from our previous Fixed Effect estimation.
Prospective pool members react to pool announcement by increasing their patenting
intensity. This also holds true if we instrument subsequent pool membership with ex
ante firm level characteristics. This finding provides robust evidence for a causal effect of
announced pool creation on the patenting activities of companies desirous to join a pool.
In a next step, we confirm this finding by comparing the effects of pool announcements
based on the ex ante characteristics of the standards.
4.4 Effect of pool announcements: Success of the pool creation
Not all patent pools are successful in attracting an important share of the patent holders
that are relevant to the standard they are related to. Several pools that were announced
by a pool licensing administrator even completely failed: the announcement was never
followed by an actual pool creation. To a large extent, the difficulties of patent pools to
draw a large share of the significant patent holders can be explained by publicly observable
information, including information already available at the time of pool announcement.
This is significant for our analysis, because we would expect that the reaction to the
pool announcement also depends on the expected likelihood that the announced pool will
succeed.
In order to assess the success of a patent pool, we measure the share of the patents in
the technological area of the standard that are owned by pool members23. We measure
this share one year after the start of the licensing program (after creation of the pool).
The share will obviously be zero for failed pool announcements. The highest share in our
sample is 0.55. We then interact this measure of pool success with our dummy variables
characterizing periods around pool creation. Following our general empirical strategy, we
concentrate on patent pools announced up to 1999. The results of model 11 (Table 7)
show that the increase in patenting intensity after pool announcement indeed depends
upon the eventual success of the announced pool. In Model 12, we estimate whether the
effect evidenced in Model 8 of pool announcements on the patenting of prospective pool
22We use the dummy variable instead of the R&D-to-sales ratio for practical reasons. We only observe
the ratio of R&D over sales for a more limited sample of firms (excluding for instance public research
institutions and other R&D specialists).
23In the case of competing pools, we measure the share of patents in the field that are owned by members
of either of the two pools. This is clearly imperfect, but any discount on this rate to account for split
pools would also be arbitrary
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(10)
Fixed Effect 2SLS IV
Early pools













Launchplus R&D spec -0.0562081
(-2.69)















t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 6: 2SLS IV Regression results Model 10
members also depends upon the future success of the announced pool. Model 12 reveals
that the increase in patenting by prospective members as compared to outsiders indeed
also depends upon the future success of the pool.
A word of caveat is warranted to qualify this finding. Indeed, it is possible that pool
success inter alia depends upon factors that are correlated with patenting intensity after
pool announcement. It is plausible for instance that the success of the patent pool depends
upon the stage of the technological life cycle at which the pool is announced. The stage of
the life cycle however is also correlated with trends in patenting intensity. The results in
Table 7 give some credit to these concerns, because future pool success is also significantly
positively correlated with patenting intensity just before pool announcement.
We therefore turn to a similar approach as in the previous section and look for variables
describing the standard at the time of pool announcement that predict the success of the
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(11) (12)
Related patents Related patents
Early pools Early pools
Fixed Effect OLS Fixed Effect OLS
Launch minus 1,2 -48.26 -1.663
(-0.52) (-0.02)
Launch plus 0,1,2 -8.968 63.67
(-0.14) (1.06)
Launch minus 1,2 membershare 579.9
(2.15)
Launch plus 0,1,2 membershare 1080.4
(5.04)
Launch minus 1,2 member -90.73
(-0.48)
Launch plus 0,1,2 member -355.3
(-2.56)
Launch minus 1,2 member ms 1175.1
(2.43)
Launch plus 0,1,2 member ms 2985.0
(7.73)
Standard age squared 0.855 0.722
(0.89) (0.75)
Declarations cumulative 0.111 0.117
(3.52) (3.73)






t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 7: Regression results Models 11 and 12
pool after its creation. We use insights from discussions with practitioners to look for
candidate variables. In particular, it is a well-known regularity that patent pools in the
area of telecommunications include much smaller shares of the relevant patents than pools
related for instance to audio-visual coding technologies (including consumer electronics
standards such as DVD, or broadcasting standards such as DVB). This regularity can be
explained by the smaller number of standard implementers, the higher profit margins of
manufacturers, and the larger prevalence of cross-licensing agreements that are typical of
telecommunication industries. Consumer electronics implementing audiovisual standards
tend to be characterized by a large number of smaller manufacturers with lower profit
margins. Patent pools are a more attractive solution for collecting royalty revenues from
these different firms. We also include the HHI index describing the concentration of patent
portfolios in the technological field related to the patent pool. A high HHI indicates
that large shares of the patents are held by few firms, a situation that simplifies bilateral
agreements and reduces the attractiveness of pool licensing. Furthermore, we include a
dummy variable assigned to aggregate pools (pool programs for complex technological
systems including multiple technical specifications). An aggregate pool licenses out a
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relatively larger bundle of patents for a relatively lower number of different uses. While
the larger number of patent holders may increase the social welfare benefits from patent
pools (by cutting down multiple margins), these benefits are not internalized by the pool
members and thus do not constitute an incentive to join the pool. The incentives to join
a patent pool however increase with the number of different uses that can be made of
the technology, because the private gains from reduced transaction costs depend on the
number of transactions that a patent holder needs to make in order to license out its
technology. We therefore expect that disaggregate pools yield higher incentives to join
than aggregate pools (a list of pools classified as aggregate or disaggregate, and telecom,
audiovisual or other, as well as their HHI and their success rate can be consulted in the
appendix).
(13)
Member share in related patents
















t statistics in parentheses
Table 8: Regression results Model 13
In Table 8, we display results of a linear regression of pool success (measured as
the share of related patents owned by pool members one year after creation) on a list
of ex ante firm characteristics. The results confirm our intuitions regarding the effects
of different standard characteristics. In particular, we find that a higher concentration
of patents, association with a telecommunication standard and the fact of licensing out
complex bundles of multiple technical specifications are all associated with a significantly
lower share of relevant patents that are owned by pool members. We will use the HHI
concentration index as well as the dummy for audiovisual technologies to instrument for
the future success of an announced pool.
The results of the 2SLS Instrumental Variable regression (Model 14) displayed in Table
9 confirm our previous Fixed Effect regression results presented in Table 7. The HHI index
and the dummy for audiovisual technologies are very strong instruments for pool success.
In the second stage of the regression, we confirm that pool announcements that are ex
ante more likely to be successful induce a stronger increase in standard-related patenting.
We see this finding as additional evidence for a causal effect of pool announcements on the
incentives to file standard-relevant patents.
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(14)
Fixed Effect 2SLS IV
Early pools


































t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 9: 2SLS IV Regression results Model 14
4.5 Patenting vs. Innovation
So far, we estimated the effect of pool announcements on the number of new priority
patent applications filed in the technological area of the standard. We do not consider
the number of patents as an indicator of inventive activities. Indeed, the existence of a
particular licensing mechanism, such as patent pools, can make it more attractive to file
a patent for a patentable invention that its inventor may otherwise have kept secret or
contributed to the public domain. It is quite plausible that patent pools have a more
significant effect on the propensity to protect inventions by patents than on the propensity
to invest in standard-related R&D.
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Lampe and Moser (2010); Flamm (2013) use indicators of technological performance of
the underlying technology to differentiate between the effects of patent pools on patenting
and innovation incentives. While appealing, this strategy is only possible for studies
confined to a single technological area, and does not allow to compare the contributions
of different companies to a common technology standard. In our firm-level study of a
comprehensive sample of different pools, we are confined to indicators of innovation that
are generally available. As a first - albeit imperfect - approach, we use the number of new
priority applications weighted by the number of forward citations received by the patent
family24.
(15) (16)
Related patents, cit.wgtd. Related patents, cit.wgtd.
Early pools Early pools
Fixed effect OLS Fixed Effect 2SLS IV
Launch minus 1,2 56.88 51.48
(0.64) (0.56)
Launch plus 0,1,2 78.46 45.58
(1.22) (0.23)
Launch minus 1,2 member 55.40 53.59
(0.38) (0.30)
Launch plus 0,1,2 member 253.8 354.6
(2.38) (0.55)
Standard age squared -0.471 0.0517
(-0.46) (0.10)
Declarations cumulative 0.0385 0.737
(1.15) (7.78)






t statistics in parentheses
Year fixed effects included but not reported
Table 10: FE and 2SLS IV Regression results Model 15 and 16
In the regressions 15 and 16, we replicate two of the essential previous analyses
(Model 7 and Model 10), and estimate the effect of a patent pool announcement on
the innovation efforts of a prospective pool member. Model 15 is a Fixed Effect linear
regression, whereas model 16 is a fixed effect 2SLS IV regression using the same instruments
for pool membership as Model 1025. The results reported in Table 10 are not clear-cut.
While the Fixed Effect OLS regression yields very similar results to the analysis unweighted
patents, the IV regression does not provide significant results. While these preliminary
analyses definitely do not rule out a positive effect of announced patent pools on innovation
24We remove duplicates and thus only count the number of different priority patent applications citing
any patent in the family.
25In fact, as the included and excluded instruments are exactly the same as in Model 10, the first stage of
the 2SLS regression is identical
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incentives, we however note that we produce evidence for a positive effect of patent pools
only on the un-weighted number of new patent applications.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we have analyzed how standard-related patenting is affected by pool
announcement and creation. Several contributions have evidenced a decline in patenting
after the creation of patent pools. We show that this decline must not be interpreted
as causal effect of the pool creation, and that the most relevant effects of patent pools
on patenting behavior occur before the creation of announced patent pools. We provide
evidence that patenting increases in response to pool announcement. There is an important
difference between pools announced before and after the policy change. While we find
evidence for a positive reaction to patent pool announcement in the case of the earlier
pools, there is no such reaction to announcements of more recent patent pools. This seems
partly to be due to anticipatory behavior.
We use differences between firms as well as between technology standards to confirm
that the observed increase in patenting after pool announcement is accountable to a
causal effect of pool creation. We confirm that firms more likely to join a pool exhibit a
stronger response to pool announcement, and the effect of pool announcement positively
depends upon the chances of successful pool creation. Our findings overall support the
prediction that patent pools have a positive effect on patenting. In particular, we confirm
the hypothesis (discussed in length by Dequiedt and Versaevel (2013) that prospective pool
creation is driving anticipatory innovation activities. Failing to take anticipatory behavior
and the intrinsic life-cycle of each specific technology standard into account would lead to
the mistaken conclusions.
Several limitations are inherent to our analysis. We do not observe an external measure
of technological progress, but only a patent count. We cannot analyze to what extent our
results are driven by an effect of patent pools on the propensity to patent, or reflect a
positive contribution of patent pools to innovation incentives. A preliminary analysis using
forward citations to weight the number of patents provides much weaker evidence for a
positive effect of patent pools. Further research investigating the effect of patent pools on
targeted R&D expenditures or a direct measure of technological progress could complement
our analysis. Furthermore, our analysis relies upon a sample of relatively homogeneous
patent pools. This excludes not only historical pools developed in a very different regulatory
environment, but also contemporary patent pools in biomedical technologies.
Based upon the evidence we have reviewed in our study, we find empirical support for
the idea that patent pools provide incentives to apply for additional patents. Furthermore,
we show that this increase in patenting is attributable to prospective members of a pool,
and that patenting increases more strongly in response to more successful pool launches.
All these findings are consistent with the idea that patent pools provide an instrument to
monetize standard-essential patents at a lower transaction costs, and hence make it more
attractive for firms likely to join such a mechanism to file for additional patents. These
findings do not reflect the full effect of patent pools on innovation or patenting, as we
do not study the effect of patent pools on follow-up innovation, and we do not take into
account the strategic responses of pool outsiders and licensees.
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We have identified 43 standards (aggregate projects or disaggregate technical specifications)
related to patent pools. We match each patent pool to the full list of technical specifications
covered by the included patents (this information is available either from the essentiality
reports of the pool, or, e.g. in the case of LTE, we use a mapping of technical specifications
to LTE built using data provided by 3GPP). We use information on declared standard-
essential patents, as well as patents included in the patent pool (which is required to
only include standard-essential patents). Overall, we use information on more than
20,000 different standard essential patent families to map specific standards documents to
disaggregated CPC and IPC classes (8 digit classification)26.
Standard essential patents claim an invention that must be used by any company
to comply with a technical standard. However, declared standard essential patents only
represent a small share of all patents that are technologically related to standards. The
number of declared essential patents furthermore depends upon strategic interactions and
policy rules, leading to a higher or lower declaration propensity (Bekkers et al., 2012;
Baron et al., 2014). While the number of declared standard-essential patents would thus
be a poor measure of investment in standards, essential patents nevertheless indicate the
CPC/IPC classes that are relevant to the standard. Therefore, we identify a standard’s
relevant technological field by using the CPC/IPC classification of declared standard
essential patents as well as patents included in the patent pools. The goal is to describe
the technological content of standardization projects related to pools using 3,000 different
CPC/IPC technology classes.
In a first step we gather all available information on standard-essential patents from
the lists of patents declared as standard essential and the lists of patents included in a
patent pool. Next, we use the PATSTAT database to match patent numbers to a patent
family identifier (INPADOC family ID). Each INPADOC family ID describes a single
invention (priority application). We remove duplicate observations per family ID (resulting
for instance from patents being filed in different countries), and obtain 22,745 unique
patent families (8,891 declared standard-essential patent families and 13,854 patent families
included in patent pools). We retrieve the CPC/IPC classification of these patent families
from the Patstat database. Only in cases where the CPC classification was not available,
we make use of the IPC classification27.
We then assign weights to classes for each INPADOC family ID depending upon
whether a class is a primary classification. We compare three weighting methods. A weight
of 0 means that all classifications are treated equally (the primary CPC class is given
the same weight as each extended CPC class), a primary-weight of 1 means that only
the primary classification is taken into account, and a weight of 0.5 means that half of
the weight is assigned to the primary class and the remaining half is distributed among
26The Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC) is a more recent classification system supplementing the
International Patent Classification (IPC). CPC is a more detailed classification system, but has the
same roots as the IPC classification.
27CPC and IPC classifications can be used together up to a level of disaggregation a the 8-digit level.
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all classes of the patent family28. Subsequently, we sum the weights over all patents
for each class and standard pair for the 8 digits CPC or the 4 digit CPC level. Finally,
for each standard-class combination we remove duplicates to keep unique standard-class
observations.
In a next step we count all patents filed from 1992 to 2014 by our sample of 190
companies. The sample includes all companies that have declared at least one patent
as standard essential29 to any of the standards in the sample. We retrieve the patents
by searching the company names as well as alternative designations (e.g. ’International
Business Machines’ or ’IBM’) in the PatStat database and by using the company assignee
merging methods of Thoma et al. (2010). This patent extraction yields 13 million patent
documents. For each patent number we retrieve the patent family identifier (INPADOC
family ID) and the CPC/IPC primary classification. Additionally we compute the number
of forward citations for each patent. We aggregate the citation and CPC/IPC information by
INPADOC family ID and then remove duplicate observations to keep only one observation
per patent family. In a next step we compute different importance weights to account for
heterogeneity in patent value. The family weighted count multiplies patent weights by the
number of forward citations and the citation weighted count multiplies patent weights by
the number of citations30. As a final point, we aggregate counts and weighted counts over
all patents for each firm, class and year. Afterwards we remove duplicates to keep unique
firm-class-year combinations.
Finally, we compute for each company the number of patent files in the technological
field of a standard. We therefore multiply the number of patent applications per firm,
year and class by the relevance of each particular class for a particular standard. For
each firm, standard and year, we sum this product over all technology classes, and then
remove duplicates to keep unique firm-standard-year observations. In creating our sample
of company-standard pairs for the econometric analysis, we consider three different sample
restrictions: 1. We only consider pool members and companies that declared a standard
essential patent. 2. For each standard, we consider all pool members, all firms that have
declared standard-essential patents, and the top ten companies that file patents in the
identified standard-relevant IPC/CPC classes31. 3. We consider all firms in our sample.
Validation
The approach of matching patent data and standards data is a novel way of measuring
standard-specific innovation activities, and we therefore compare different weighting,
counting and aggregation options. We apply general criteria to discard methods that
appear to result in a poor match between patents and standards (details will be published in
a forthcoming paper). We find that including the extended classification of patents clearly
28E.g. for a patent with one primary and 4 extended classifications, the primary class receives 0.6 weight,
and each of the extended classes receives 0.1 weight.
29According to data provided by IPLytics
30We divide the number of citations by the average number of citations for patents with this priority year
in order to address truncation effects. This approach is used e.g. in the NBER patent database (see
Hall et al., 2001).
31We consider the cumulative count of patent up to the date of pool launch
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improves the matching method (and hence discard the primary weight 1)32, and that family
weighting schemes result in a poorer fit than unweighted or citation-weighted patent counts.
In the analysis we ensure that our results are robust to all remaining specification choices
that are not discarded by clear and general criteria. We use three different criteria to assess
the performance of our methodology. First, we assess to what extent peaks in patenting in
the classes identified as standard-relevant coincide with the timing of standard development.
Second, we analyze whether declarations of standard-essential patents for this standard
coincide with peaks in patenting in the identified standard-relevant classes. Finally, we
assess whether the companies holding the largest portfolios of declared standard-essential
patents for this standard are also identified as being among the largest patent holders in
the relevant standard-relevant classes. In the following, we present analyses confirming
that our selected methodologies reliably identify technology classes that are indeed closely
related to the specific standard.
Timing
To test the different choices of how to map patents to standards we cumulate the preferred
measure over time up to the year of standard release. We then compare the timing of
patent files to the development of a standard’s life time. Once a standard is set and
published, the main technology development of the standard is completed and we would
thus expect decreasing investments in the technology standard. A good standard related
patent measure would thus suggest an increase of patenting up to standard release and a
decrease thereafter. We regress the number of identified standard related patents on a full
set of standard age dummies (each dummy represents a number of years since or up to
standard release), controlling for other time effects by including an overall count of patent
files per year, and including company-standard pair fixed effects.
The graphs in Figure 1 show the normalized coefficients of regressing standard age
dummies over the full sample (left), pool members, declaring companies and top 10
patent holders (center) and for pool members and declaring companies only (right).
The comparison of the different weightings of primary or extended CPC/IPC reveals
that a weight of 0.5 shows a development that is most closely related to the standard
lifetime developments. In figure 2-4 we illustrate that using a primary weight of 0.5,
both unweighted and citation-weighted patent counts as well as the different groupings of
company standard pairs display an increase of patenting prior to a standard release and a
decrease of patenting thereafter. The differences between the different selected methods
seem to be relatively insignificant.
Succession of standard generations
We can illustrate the correlation of our computed measure of standard-related patenting
with standard development by comparing different generations of standards in the same
32This finding is in line with Benner and Waldfogel (2008), who suggest using all IPC classifications of
patents, not only the primary classification, and at a relatively aggregate level. In contrast to Benner
and Waldfogel (2008), we however find that the method is improved by assigning a higher weight to the
primary IPC class.
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Figure 2: Normalized coefficients of standard age dummies before and
after standard release
technical field. We can compare telecommunication standards, which evolved from 2G
(GSM) to 4G (LTE). Therefore we compare the patenting of citation-weighted patent
counts for all company standard pairs over time for GSM and LTE.
Figure 3: Normalized levels of patenting over time
We replicate the analysis for different generations of the audio/video coding standards
developed by the Moving Picture Expert Group (MPEG): mp3 (MPEG1 Audio), MPEG2,
MPEG 4 Visual and AVC. Both examples of standard generations show that our measure
very well measures the timing differences. Patents filed for GSM decrease after 2000,
while LTE patents increase thereafter and peak around 2008. The same is true for the
audio/video coding standards, where mp3 related patents are filed in early years of the
90ies and AVC patents in late 2000, whereas patenting for MPEG2 and MPEG4 visual
peaks in between these dates. These time trends clearly mirror the different steps in the
progress of the different technological fields.
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Figure 4: Normalized levels of patenting over time
Identification of largest patent holders
We use the calculated cumulative number of patent files by company-standard pairs at the
time of patent launch to establish a ranking of the largest patent holders. We compare
these lists of top patent holders with the lists of pool members and companies declaring
standard-essential patents in order to assess if our counting methods actually reveal relevant
patent files of a particular company for a particular standard33. We picked four large
patent pools representing four different technology fields, and we compare the list of top
patent holders. We find that almost all identified top patent holders also declared to
own standard-essential patents for this standard. In the case of AVC or the two DVD
patent pools, most of the significant patent holders have also been pool members at least
at some time over the period of observation. This is not the case for the WiFi and GSM
standards. In the case of DVD, Thomson, which was known to be a significant pool
outsider, is identified as a relevant patent holder for this standard. In the case of GSM,
we find that the ranking of patents in the field is quite representative of the number of
declarations. This is not the case for AVC and WiFi, which were developed at SSOs that
allow companies to declare to own standard-essential patents without specifying specific
patent numbers.
33By picking the largest patent pools in their respective fields, we also pick pools for which we had a
higher number of patent observations to establish the matching. The matching works ”less well” for
smaller standards, where the number of observations is lower.
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AVC DVD IEEE 802.11 GSM
Company Pool Decs Company Pool Company Pool Decs Company Pool Decs
1 Hitachi Y 0 Sony Y Ericsson N 1 Ericsson N 57
2 Philips Y 3 Canon N Siemens N 0 Nokia Y 1,425
3 Sony Y 11 Thomson N Nokia N 51 Siemens N 205
4 Siemens Y 5 Samsung Y Sony Y 1 Qualcomm N 553
5 Samsung Y 2 Philips Y Philips Y 11 Motorola N 1,682
6 IBM N 32 Hitachi Y LG Y 4 NEC N 102
7 NEC N 3 Toshiba Y Motorola N 8 Sony N 0
8 Fujitsu Y 3 NEC N Thomson N 1 Samsung N 53
9 Toshiba Y 3 Sanyo Y Nortel N 5 Philips N 167
10 Intel N 3 LG Y Intel N 10 Toshiba N 9
11 Thomson N 55 Fujitsu N IBM N 5 Hitachi N 0
12 LG Y 3 Sharp Y NEC N 1 Bosch N 18
13 STMicro N 0 Intel N Huawei N 3 Thomson N 0
14 Motorola N 25 Siemens N Samsung N 0 Canon N 0
15 Seiko N 0 Mitsubishi Y NTT Y 3 Nortel N 10
Table 11: Top patent holders in the field of selected pools
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Appendix 2
Standard Patent share Aggregate AV Telecom HHI patents
AGORA-C 1 0 0
AMR 0 0 1
AMR-WB+ 0.0086 0 0 1 0.0580
AMR-WB/G.722.2 0.0599 0 0 0 0.0604
ATSC 0.0992 1 1 0 0.1649
AVC 0.6118 0 1 0 0.0549
BluRay 0.7891 1 1 0 0.1002
CDMA-2000 1 0 1
DAB 0 1 1 0 0.0568
DECT 0 1 0.1365
DVB-H 0 0 1 0 0.3055
DVB-MHP 0.1456 1 1 0 0.4660
dvb-t 0.0223 1 1 0 0.0631
dvb-t2 0.1265 1 1 0 0.0646
DVD 0.6081 1 1 0 0.1107
Digital Radio Mondiale 0.1343 1 1 0 .4788
G 711.1 0.2107 0 0 1 0.1301
G 723.1 0.1178 0 0 1 0.1115
G 729 0.0038 0 0 1 0.5385
G 729.1 0.0957 0 0 1 0.5085
H.264 SVC 0 1 0
IEEE1394 0.2947 1 0 0 0.0817
IEEE802.11 0.2510 1 0 0 0.0485
LTE 0.0634 1 0 1 0.0604
mp3 0 1 0 0.0647
MPEG Surround 0.3232 0 1 0 0.3602
MPEG2 0.2379 0 1 0 0.5449
MPEG2 AAC 0 0 1 0
MPEG4 Audio 0.2930 0 1 0 0.0681
MPEG4 SLS 0 1 0 0
MPEG4 Systems 0.2285 0 1 0 0.0672
MPEG4 Visual 0.7369 0 1 0 0.0934
MPEG7 0 0 1 0 0.1428
MVC 0.3461 0 1 0 0.0759
NFC 0 1 0 0 0.2550
OCAP 0 1 0
GSM 0.0292 1 0 1 0.0508
TOP Teletext 0 0 1 0
TV Anytime 0.5341 1 1 0 0.3503
UHF-RFID 0.0762 1 0 0 0.0611
VC-1 0.7202 0 0 0 0.1853
W-CDMA 0.3876 1 0 1 0.0571
WSS 0 0 1 0 0.4199
Table 12: Patent pools by success rate (patent share), technological
category, HHI
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